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Since the discovery of Iraqs biological
weapons program, concern regarding the threat
of biological warfare has increased (1). Anthrax
immunizations; increased nuclear, biological,
and chemical defense training; improved
detection systems and protective gear; and
increased vigilance have been instituted to
protect the military.
However, the military is not the only
population at risk for biological attack. To
effectively counter the potentially devastating
effects of an attack, we need to understand the
basic epidemiologic principles of biological
agents used as weapons.
A biological agent is commonly portrayed as
a genetically engineered organism resistant to
all known vaccines and drugs, highly contagious,
and able to harm thousands of people. However,
alleged attacks by the Aum Shinrikyo did not
result in a single illness from a biological agent
(2), and the successful 1984 contamination of
salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon, by a religious
cult involved a common salmonella strain that
was not lethal or contagious and was susceptible
to antibiotics (3).
Therefore, our level of suspicion and
diligence in identifying and reacting to a
biological attack must remain high, since the
attack may not follow an expected pattern.
Furthermore, a small outbreak of illness could be
an early warning of a more serious attack, and
recognition and prompt institution of preventive
measures (such as effective vaccines and
antibiotics) could save thousands of lives.
To facilitate the rapid identification of a
bioterrorist attack, all health-care providers and
public health personnel should have basic
epidemiologic skills and knowledge of what to
expect in such a setting.
Differential Diagnosis
Any small or large outbreak of disease should
be evaluated as a potential bioterrorist attack.
This initial investigation does not have to be time
consuming or involve law enforcement. A look at
the facts surrounding the outbreak to determine
if anything seems unusual or indicative of
bioterrorism should suffice. Since a disease
outbreak can be the result of intentional
contamination, the differential diagnosis of an
outbreak should first be considered. The
possibilities include a spontaneous outbreak of a
known endemic disease, a spontaneous outbreak
of a new or reemerging disease, a laboratory
accident, or an intentional attack with a
biological agent. Epidemiologic tools can assist in
differentiating between these possibilities.
The cause of a disease or even the occurrence
of something unusual may be very difficult to
determine, especially if the initial cases are few.
Surveillance needs to be more than routine. Not
only unusually high rates of illness but also
unusual diseases should signal a warning. For
example, even one case of inhalation anthrax
should cause immediate concern and action.
Unlike chemical terrorism, biological terror-
ism is not immediately obvious but may appear
insidiously, with primary-care providers wit-
nessing the first cases. However, it may not even
be emergency room personnel who first detect a
problem. The first to notice could be a hospital
laboratory seeing unusual strains of organisms,
or the county epidemiologist keeping track of
hospital admissions, or even pharmacists
distributing more antibiotics than usual, 911
operators noticing an increase in respiratory
distress calls, or funeral directors with increased
business. All epidemiologic data should be
tracked and aggressively followed to ensure the
most rapid recognition and response.
Epidemiologic Approach
The basic epidemiologic approach in the
evaluation of a potential bioterrorist or
biowarfare attack is not different from any
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standard epidemiologic investigation. The first
step is to use laboratory and clinical findings to
confirm that a disease outbreak has occurred. A
case definition should be constructed to
determine the number of cases and the attack
rate. The use of objective criteria in the
development of a case definition is very
important in determining an accurate case
number, as both additional cases may be found
and some may be excluded, especially as the
potential exists for hysteria to be confused with
actual disease. The estimated rate of illness
should be compared with rates during previous
years to determine if the rate constitutes a
deviation from the norm.
Once the case definition and attack rate have
been determined, the outbreak can be character-
ized in the conventional context of time, place,
and person. These data will provide crucial
information in determining the potential source
of the outbreak.
Epidemic Curve
Using data gathered on cases over time, an
epidemic curve can be calculated. The disease
pattern is an important factor in differentiating
between a natural outbreak and an intentional
attack. In most naturally occurring outbreaks,
numbers of cases gradually increase as a
progressively larger number of people come in
contact with other patients, fomites, and vectors
that can spread disease. Eventually, most of the
population has been exposed and is immune to
further disease, and the number of cases, or
epidemic curve, gradually decreases. Con-
versely, a bioterrorism attack is most likely to be
caused by a point source, with everyone coming
in contact with the agent at approximately the
same time. The epidemic curve in this case would
be compressed, with a peak in a matter of days or
even hours, even with physiologic and exposure
differences. If the biological agent is contagious,
it is possible to see a second curve peak after the
first, as original cases expose originally
unexposed persons to the agent. The steep
epidemic curve expected in a bioterrorism attack
is similar to what would be seen with other point
source exposures, such as foodborne outbreaks.
Therefore, the compressed epidemic curve is still
not pathognomonic for an intentional bioterrorism
attack.
If a specific group has been exposed, the
epidemic curve may indicate the time of
exposure. From this information, a possible
incubation period can be calculated, which can
assist in determining the potential cause of
illness, as well as suggesting a possible
intentional attack (if the incubation period is
shorter than usual as a result of an unusually
high inoculum or more effective exposure route).
Calculating the incubation period may also help
determine if the disease is spread from person to
person, which is extremely important to effective
disease control measures.
Epidemiologic Clues
As steep epidemic curves can be seen in
natural point-source exposures, additional
characteristics of the outbreak should be
investigated in determining whether it is the
result of a biological attack (4,5). None of the
following clues alone constitute proof of
intentional use of a biological agent, but together
they can assist greatly in determining if further
investigation is warranted. 1) The presence of a
large epidemic, with greater case loads than
expected, especially in a discrete population.
2) More severe disease than expected for a given
pathogen, as well as unusual routes of exposure,
such as a preponderance of inhalational disease
as was seen in Sverdlovsk after the accidental
release of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores
(6). 3) A disease that is unusual for a given
geographic area, is found outside the normal
transmission season, or is impossible to transmit
naturally in the absence of the normal vector for
transmission. 4) Multiple simultaneous epidem-
ics of different diseases. 5) A disease outbreak
with zoonotic as well as human consequences, as
many of the potential threat agents are
pathogenic to animals. 6) Unusual strains or
variants of organisms or antimicrobial resistance
patterns disparate from those circulating.
7) Higher attack rates in those exposed in certain
areas, such as inside a building if the agent was
released indoors, or lower rates in those inside a
sealed building if an aerosol was released
outdoors. 8) Intelligence that an adversary has
access to a particular agent or agents. 9) Claims
by a terrorist of the release of a biologic agent.
10) Direct evidence of the release of an agent,
with findings of equipment, munitions, or
tampering.
Even with the presence of more than one of
the above indicators, it may not be easy to
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nefarious means. For example, it took months to
determine that the outbreak of salmonellosis in
Oregon was caused by intentional contamination
of salad bars (3). Other outbreaks, such as the
hantavirus outbreak in the Four Corners area of
the United States, have been thought of as
possible results of intentional contamination (7).
Even if no conclusive answer can be derived
quickly, the means employed in determining the
cause of an attack will still provide medical
personnel with information that may prevent
illness and death.
Recommendations for Preparedness
Improved awareness and readiness should a
bioterrorism attack occur include education of all
medical personnel, especially primary-care
providers and emergency personnel first to see
patients affected by a biological attack. Training
should include basic epidemiologic principles as
well as clinical information on diagnosing and
treating agents that pose the highest threat.
Training should be refreshed periodically to
ensure that skills remain current.
Improved surveillance efforts should be
instituted with as close to real-time data
gathering as possible. All facets of surveillance
should be used, to include emergency visits,
laboratory data, pharmacy use, school absentee-
ism, or any other data that correlate with an
increase in infectious disease. Robust surveil-
lance systems are essential to detecting any
emerging or reemerging disease. Quick recogni-
tion of any change in disease patterns will
facilitate determining the source and preventing
further exposure, which should be the key
driving force behind any epidemiologic investi-
gation. Through strong epidemiologic training, a
close attention to disease patterns, and a healthy
respect for the threat of biological terrorism,
potential problems can be discovered rapidly,
and actions can be taken to decrease the impact
of disease, regardless of its origin.
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